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P2P 网络借贷文献综述及外文文献互联网金融
篇一:互联网金融外文参考文献
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献 、文献综述
一、外文文献
标题: Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending
作者: Berger, Sven C; Gleisner, Fabian
期刊: Business Research；卷: 2；期: 1；页: 39-65；出版年份: 2009
Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P
Lending
Abstract
We analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these market participants act as financial intermediaries and significantly improve borrowers' credit conditions by reducing information asymmetries, predominantly for borrowers with less attractive risk characteristics. Our findings may be surprising given the replacement of a bank by an electronic marketplace.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, intermediation, social lending, electronic markets
1 Introduction
The evolution of information technology in recent years has led to the development of electronic marketplaces where traditional intermediaries may be less important or even redundant for the economic interaction of market participants (Benjamin and Wigand 1995, Evans and Wurster 1997, Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Within the financial services industry, the debate about disintermediation and the future relevance of financial intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 2001, Nellis, McCaffery, and Hutchinson 2000, Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell 1999) is fueled by the increasing role of electronic lending markets (P2P Lending or Social Lending) where an electronic marketplace replaces a bank as the traditional intermediary and enables the brokerage of consumer loans directly between borrowers and lenders (Hulme and Wright 2006, Meyer 2007). A recent study predicts that within the next few years such social banking platforms may have a market share of ten percent of the worldwide market for retail lending and financial planning (Gartner Inc. 2008). For the US, the P2P lending market is estimated to grow to a volume of up to ten billion USD within the next 10 years (Bruene 2007). We examine more than 14,000 credit transactions on the American electronic P2P lending platform Prosper.com, covering all transactions that took place in the market between 2005-11 and 2007-09. Our analysis of the P2P credit market starts with the observation that, despite the direct mediation of loans in the marketplace, new types of intermediaries emerge as market participants provide
paid intermediary services. In the paper we then focus on the following questions: (1) From a theoretical point of view, how can these intermediaries create value in the interaction between borrowers and lenders? (2) Should all borrowers make use of an intermediary, and can it make sense to pay for intermediary services? (3) From the borrowers' perspective, what is the economic impact of intermediation in the electronic lending marketplace? Our empirical analysis is confirmatory in nature. It is based on the literature on financial intermediation (e. g., Diamond 1984, Leland and Pyle 1976) from which we derive hypotheses on the role of intermediaries in electronic marketplaces.
2 Intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces
2.1 Electronic marketplaces and disintermediation
Markets are essential for economic activity in mediating the demand for and supply of goods and services. Intermediaries help to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers by (1) providing transaction processing capabilities, (2) bringing enhanced levels of knowledge and expertise, and (3) adding to the transactability of a given good or service (Chircu and Kauffman 2000).
The internet has made e-commerce possible where electronic markets are becoming more important in coordinating supply and demand (Grieger 2003, Segev, Gebauer, and Farber 1999). Electronic markets can facilitate economic activity even under complex and insecure conditions (Cordella 2006), significantly reduce information and transaction costs, and may in this way displace traditional intermediaries (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Many authors argue that once electronic markets emerge, traditional intermediaries may be threatened by an electronic brokerage effect also called disintermediation (for a literature overview see Chircu and Kauffman 2000). In sharp contrast to that, the theoretical contributions on electronic markets and disintermediation have not yet been supported by convincing empirical evidence (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Sen and King 2003). Moreover, the displacement of traditional intermediaries may never occur. Authors like Sarkar, Butler, and Steinfield (1998) or Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that electronic markets may lead to new forms of intermediation.
2.2 Electronic lending platforms
Electronic lending platforms are electronic markets that mediate between borrowers and lenders of loans.Wefocus here on consumer loans between individual borrowers and lenders and exclude platforms for bonds or syndicated loans (Steelmann 2006). The electronic credit marketplace as a website in the World Wide Web constitutes the general conditions for peer-to-peer lending and provides the administration of current loans. Electronic lending platforms differ in the way loans are originated: Some providers mediate between borrowers and lenders themselves, whereas other providers match borrowers' credit listings and lenders' bids with an auction mechanism (Meyer 2007).
The lion share of participants in the marketplace are private individuals, although there are institutional lenders investing in some, too. There are numerous providers that operate nationally due to differing regulatory frameworks. Table 1 provides an overview of the three major Anglo-American and German providers and their
business models. A recent development of the business model of P2P lending marketplaces is that lenders may trade loans prior to maturity, increasing the liquidity of P2P loans. As of February 2009, Prosper is still in the process, whereas Lending Club has already successfully registered with the SEC to create a secondary loan market. Despite differing business models, there is one distinctive feature that these marketplaces have in common: Transactions in electronic credit marketplaces occur anonymously between fictitious "screen names". Therefore, information is asymmetrically distributed between borrowers and lenders. Loans are not collateralized and lenders face the inherent risk of default (Steelmann 2006).
Despite anonymous interactions, loan listings contain additional information on potential borrowers. Lenders can evaluate individual creditworthiness through quantitative as well as qualitative figures. Prosper.com, America's largest peer-topeer lending marketplace, provides an individual rating and an indicator of indebtedness in cooperation with the credit reporting agency Experian as the two main quantitative figures. The informational value of these figures should be considered high, although the degree to which consumer credit reports are accurate, complete or consistent is in dispute (Avery, Calem, Canner, and Bostic 2003). Most platforms give market participants the opportunity to provide additional personal information about their background, their financial standing and the purpose of the loan. This qualitative, "soft" information is mandatory and its validity is a priori not controlled. Borrowers thereby might have an incentive to overemphasize their "quality" (the present value of the prospective projects, their financial standing or payment behavior) in their personal descriptions (moral hazard).
2.3 Groups on Prosper.com
In addition to personal profiles, borrowers and lenders can form groups. These smaller communities within the marketplace review and assess the creditworthiness of individual members. Groups are potentially beneficial for market participants by providing and verifying information or obtaining additional information about borrowers that is not publicly available. Groups lack distinct ownership and governance features as they typically exist in credit cooperatives (Davis 2001, Taylor 1971). There is no ownership of the groups, and there is no collective decision mechanism on accepting group members or granting loans. Furthermore, groups do not exclusively deal with their members. At any time, lenders from outside the group may invest in a group member's loan listing. This implies that there is no rotation of money within the group, and no specific allocation process. There are two papers that specifically examine the role of groups on the P2P lending website Prosper.com: Freedman and Jin (2008) use transaction data from 200601-06 until 2008-07-31 covering around 290,000 loan listings and 25,000 funded loans. They find evidence for the idea that the monitoring within social networks provides a stronger incentive to pay off loans ex-post: Loans with friend endorsements and friend bids have fewer missed payments and yield significantly higher rates of return than other loans. Everett (2008) looks at the influence of group membership on loan default within 13,486 Prosper loans. The dataset covers funded loans from 2006-05-31 until 2007-11-06 and incorporates ex post loan performance information until 2008-05-07.互联网金融外文参考文献。互联网金融外文参考文献。
He finds that membership in a group significantly decreases loan default risk if the group enforces real-life personal connections like, e.g., employees of the same company or alumni of a certain university. Both studies presented above look at social networks in the credit market but do not specifically take the group leader into account. It is, however, not the group as an institution per se, but the group leader who decides about membership and plays a substantial role in the lending process.
2.4 Group leaders as financial intermediaries
In order to reduce information asymmetries, lenders must screen potential borrowers. Given the large number of available credit listings, it can be costly or impossible to process the information available about potential borrowers. Therefore, intermediaries emerge in the electronic marketplace offering intermediary services in order to assess and limit credit risk. Every participant in the online lending platform can found a group and become a group leader. Group leaders set membership criteria and administer the group. Groups are smaller communities within the marketplace where group members may share a bond based on employment, geography, education, common leisure activities, or other factors. The principle that people from close communities act more responsibly towards each other aims to lower the risk of defaults and therefore enables lending at better rates. Among the most important tasks of the group leader is the screening of borrowers within the group (a voluntary due diligence known as "vetting"). Within groups, it is common that borrowers send personal documents regarding their identity, income, and other pertinent information to the group leader. The group leader may also establish personal contact with the borrowers' employer to verify the personal income in order to recommend a borrower's credit listing.
All in all, the intermediary reduces uncertainty for lenders, which should be reflected in lower required risk premiums. The arguments provided above lead us to the first fundamental hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1: Borrowers within groups are able to borrow at lower credit spreads. Next, we formulate three hypotheses that enable us to decompose the role of the group leader in the lending marketplace. With imperfect information about borrowers' credit quality, lenders can use publicly observable signals to assess credit risk (Riley 1975, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Spence 1973). Observable characteristics or actions can serve as signals. On the electronic lending platform Prosper, the recommendation of a credit listing by a group leader is a strong observable signal of credit quality. Borrowers can voluntarily provide additional private information regarding their financial standing to their group leader. Group leaders can then recommend credit listings within their groups. This observable recommendation serves as a signal of good credit quality for the marketplace.This leads to:
Hypothesis H2: The recommendation of a credit listing by the group leader leads to lower credit spreads.
The reliability of information produced by an intermediary is a prevalent problem in the intermediation literature. Group leaders might recommend credit listings within their group without prior diligent screening. It may be difficult or impossible for potential lenders to distinguish good information from bad. Group leaders can signal
credibility of a recommendation by bidding on the recommended credit listing. The potential investment of the group leader is an observable signal for information quality (Leland and Pyle 1976). We derive:
Hypothesis H3a: A group leader's bidding serves as a credible signal for the quality of the credit listing and results in lower credit spreads.
Hypothesis H3b: A group leader's bidding on a credit listing signals information quality and has a stronger impact on credit spreads than a recommendation by the group leader.
We derive two additional hypotheses about the reputation and the size of groups. Past activities within a group, especially regarding the diligent assessment of individual borrowers by the group leader, are only imperfectly observable. In contrast, the reputation of a group in the electronic marketplace is observable from its group rating. The group rating is a measurement of a group's performance in paying back its loans in comparison with expected (historical) default rates. A defaulted loan worsens a group's rating and therefore its reputation. Tirole (1996) shows analytically how a group's good reputation positively influences individual behavior. The group rating reflects a group's ability to assess borrowers' credit quality, and serves as a proxy for the group leader's behavior in the future.
In addition to a group leader's general ability, we argue that group reputation serves as an effective mechanism to prevent collusion between the group leader and a borrower within the group. The phenomenon of collusion (see, e.g., Tirole 1991) could be a major concern for participants in the electronic lending marketplace. This would be the case if a potential borrower could "bribe" the group leader in order to receive a recommendation and a bid. With an increasing probability for such collusive behavior, the credibility of the observable actions of the intermediary would be significantly reduced. This would be reflected in a decreasing group rating due to higher than expected defaults within the group. We deduce:
Hypothesis H4: A higher group rating leads to lower credit spreads.
When deciding to join a group, market participants face the choice of group size. At first sight, a smaller group seems to offer a potentially closeknit community in the marketplace that facilitates the interaction and closer collaboration of group members with the group leader. This is fairly comparable to the stream of literature on relationship lending that emphasizes the exchange and evaluation of "soft information" within small banks (Petersen and Rajan 1994, Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005). On closer examination, and presumably more important, borrowers and lenders might prefer larger groups because they generate more opportunities for exchange, collectively provide more funds for loans, and, thus, offer easier access to credit. From an investor's perspective, in addition to a larger network, bigger groups are attractive because they may enable effective "peer-monitoring" which lowers credit risk. The concept of peermonitoring, where group members have better information and intra-group monitoring leads to greater rates of repayment, is formalized in a large body of academic literature dealing with the optimal design of group lending agreements in the context of developing economies (Stiglitz 1990, Varian 1990, Chowdhury 2005, Besley and Coate 1995).
P2P网络借贷金融文献综述及外文文献资料
篇二:互联网金融外文参考文献
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献 、文献综述
一、外文文献
文献信息
标题: Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending
作者: Berger, Sven C; Gleisner, Fabian
期刊名称: Business Research；第2卷； 第1期；页码：39-65
年份: 2015.
Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P
Lending
Abstract
We analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these market participants act as financial intermediaries and significantly improve borrowers' credit conditions by reducing information asymmetries, predominantly for borrowers with less attractive risk characteristics. Our findings may be surprising given the replacement of a bank by an electronic marketplace.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, intermediation, social lending, electronic markets
Manuscript received July 7, 2008, accepted by Christian Schlag (Finance) March 5, 2009.
1 Introduction
The evolution of information technology in recent years has led to the development of electronic marketplaces where traditional intermediaries may be less important or even redundant for the economic interaction of market participants (Benjamin and
Wigand 1995, Evans and Wurster 1997, Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Within the financial services industry, the debate about disintermediation and the future relevance of financial intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 2001, Nellis, McCaffery, and Hutchinson 2000, Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell 1999) is fueled by the increasing role of electronic lending markets (P2P Lending or Social Lending) where an electronic marketplace replaces a bank as the traditional intermediary and enables the brokerage of consumer loans directly between borrowers and lenders (Hulme and Wright 2006, Meyer 2007). A recent study predicts that within the next few years such social banking platforms may have a market share of ten percent of the worldwide market for retail lending and financial planning (Gartner Inc. 2008). For the US, the P2P lending market is estimated to grow to a volume of up to ten billion USD within the next 10 years (Bruene 2007). We examine more than 14,000 credit transactions on the American electronic P2P lending platform Prosper.com, covering all transactions that took place in the market between 2005-11 and 2007-09. Our analysis of the P2P credit market starts with the observation that, despite the direct mediation of loans in the marketplace, new types of intermediaries emerge as market participants provide paid intermediary services. In the paper we then focus on the following questions: (1) From a theoretical point of view, how can these intermediaries create value in the interaction between borrowers and lenders? (2) Should all borrowers make use of an intermediary, and can it make sense to pay for intermediary services? (3) From the borrowers' perspective, what is the economic impact of intermediation in the electronic lending marketplace? Our empirical analysis is confirmatory in nature. It is based on the literature on financial intermediation (e. g., Diamond 1984, Leland and Pyle 1976) from which we derive hypotheses on the role of intermediaries in electronic marketplaces.
The electronic lending platform Prosper provides an excellent laboratory for studying intermediaries in electronic marketplaces. Prosper is the largest provider with nearly 90 million USD in loans originated in the examination period from 2005-11 to 2007-09, as market participants were permitted to act as paid intermediaries in this period. As of 2008-09-30, Prosper dominated the US market for P2P lending with a
total of 176 million USD in issued loans, followed by its competitor Lending Club with 19 million USD.1 At that time, the market share of P2P consumer loans represented a fraction of the around 490 billion USD of non-revolving consumer credit outstanding at commercial banks (Federal Reserve 2008). All loans on Prosper have an identical maturity of 36 months. Our data sample includes detailed information on 14,321 financial transactions as well as the market participants that chose to participate in the market and covers transactions with and without the use of an intermediary. This allows us to test for aspects of the financial transaction and individual factors that might influence the usage of intermediary services. In line with traditional intermediation theory, we find that financial intermediaries on electronic P2P lending platforms have significant impact on borrowers' credit conditions, suggesting that intermediation helps to reduce the prevalent information asymmetries. The intermediary primarily contributes by screening potential borrowers. A mandatory screening process by means of the intermediary's commitment to screen every borrower within the group significantly improves borrowers' access to credit. Following diligent screening, the intermediary's recommendation of a borrower signals better information about creditworthiness and thus leads to better credit conditions. Moreover, bidding on the screened borrower's credit listing has an even stronger impact on the resulting interest rate.
Our results indicate that borrowers should consider the reputation of an intermediary as it serves as a good proxy for the future diligent assessment of borrowers. Intermediation costs can be compensated by lower interest margins for borrowers. These results are robust to self-selection regarding the choice of an intermediary and characteristics of the financial transaction. All in all, our results suggest that financial intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces may create substantial value for borrowers. Our findings are consistent with a stream of literature suggesting that electronic markets create business opportunities for new intermediaries (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Methlie and Pedersen 2002, Bakos 1991, Bakos 1998, Sen and King 2003). Despite the electronic credit marketplace enables the direct mediation of loans, new financial intermediaries emerge between borrowers and lenders. There are
several reasons why our results are of particular interest also for banks and other financial service providers that face the strategic decision of an active involvement in electronic lending markets. One option could be to participate in these marketplaces and offer financial advisory. Another interesting possibility could be to enter the P2P lending market and to establish a new marketplace to support the existing retail operations and enable cross-selling. Eventually, lending marketplaces are potential customers for banks' transaction services.
Our approach to examining the role of financial intermediaries on electronic lending platforms makes three important contributions to the literature: First, this is one of the first studies analyzing an electronic lending marketplace, and the first study to empirically examine intermediation on an electronic P2P lending platform. We explain how electronic credit markets work, and provide insights into the role of intermediaries in the marketplace. Second, we test theoretical predictions from the literature on financial intermediation with new data. Our sample of more than 14,000 transactions on a P2P lending marketplace includes detailed information on the involved market participants and the loan characteristics. The dataset covers the complete transaction history of the credit marketplace for a time period of almost two years. Third, we quantify the economic impact of intermediation and other transaction characteristics on borrowers' loan spread and show that the usage of financial intermediaries which are neither professional nor institutional but members of the network may significantly improve the terms of trade for the borrowers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section gives an overview of electronic P2P lending platforms and explains the functioning of these marketplaces. Section 3 summarizes the relevant previous literature on financial intermediation and derives hypotheses about the role of intermediaries on electronic lending platforms. Section 4 overviews the methodology employed, describes the data, and presents the empirical results of our analyses as well as robustness tests. In section 5 we conclude with a summary and the limitations of our study.
2 Intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces
2.1 Electronic marketplaces and disintermediation
Markets are essential for economic activity in mediating the demand for and supply of goods and services. Intermediaries help to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers by (1) providing transaction processing capabilities, (2) bringing enhanced levels of knowledge and expertise, and (3) adding to the transactability of a given good or service (Chircu and Kauffman 2000).
The internet has made e-commerce possible where electronic markets are becoming more important in coordinating supply and demand (Grieger 2003, Segev, Gebauer, and Farber 1999). Electronic markets can facilitate economic activity even under complex and insecure conditions (Cordella 2006), significantly reduce information and transaction costs, and may in this way displace traditional intermediaries (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Many authors argue that once electronic markets emerge, traditional intermediaries may be threatened by an electronic brokerage effect also called disintermediation (for a literature overview see Chircu and Kauffman 2000). In sharp contrast to that, the theoretical contributions on electronic markets and disintermediation have not yet been supported by convincing empirical evidence (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Sen and King 2003). Moreover, the displacement of traditional intermediaries may never occur. Authors like Sarkar, Butler, and Steinfield (1998) or Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that electronic markets may lead to new forms of intermediation.
2.2 Electronic lending platforms
Electronic lending platforms are electronic markets that mediate between borrowers and lenders of loans.Wefocus here on consumer loans between individual borrowers and lenders and exclude platforms for bonds or syndicated loans (Steelmann 2006). The electronic credit marketplace as a website in the World Wide Web constitutes the general conditions for peer-to-peer lending and provides the administration of current loans. Electronic lending platforms differ in the way loans are originated: Some providers mediate between borrowers and lenders themselves, whereas other providers match borrowers' credit listings and lenders' bids with an auction mechanism (Meyer 2007).
The lion share of participants in the marketplace are private individuals, although
互联网金融对传统金融业的影响外文文献翻译
篇三:互联网金融外文参考文献
文献出处: Ramsey; Labored. Internet Finance's Impact on Traditional Finance [J]. The Journal of International Finance, 2014, 16(2): 31-49.
原文
Internet Finance's Impact on Traditional Finance
Ramsey; Labored.
Abstract
As the advances in modern information and Internet technology, especially the develop of cloud computing, big data, mobile Internet, search engines and social networks, profoundly change, even subvert many traditional industries, and the financial industry is no exception. In recent years, financial industry has become the most far-reaching area influenced by Internet, after commercial distribution and the media. Many Internet-based financial service models have emerged, and have had a profound and huge impact on traditional financial industries. "Internet-Finance" has win the focus of public attention.
Internet-Finance is low cost, high efficiency, and pays more attention to the user experience, and these features enable it to fully meet the special needs of traditional "long tail financial market", to flexibly provide more convenient and efficient financial services and diversified financial products, to greatly expand the scope and depth of financial services, to shorten the distance between people space and time, and to establish a new financial environment, which effectively integrate and take use of fragmented time, information, capital and other scattered resources, then add up to form a scale, and grow a new profit point for various financial institutions. Moreover, with the continuous penetration and integration in traditional financial field, Internet-Finance will bring new challenges, but also opportunities to the traditional. It contribute to the transformation of the traditional commercial banks, compensate for the lack of efficiency in funding process and information integration, and provide new distribution channels for securities, insurance, funds and other financial products. For many SMEs, Internet-Finance extend their financing channels, reduce their financing threshold, and improve their efficiency in using funds. However, the cross-industry nature of the Internet Finance determines its risk factors are more complex, sensitive
and varied, and therefore we must properly handle the relationship between innovative development and market regulation, industry self-regulation.
Key Words ：Internet Finance; Commercial Banks; Effects; Regulatory
1 Introduction
The continuous development of Internet technology, cloud computing, big data, a growing number of Internet applications such as social networks for the business development of traditional industry provides a strong support, the level of penetration of the Internet on the traditional industry. The end of the 20th century, Microsoft chairman Bill Gates, who declared, "the traditional commercial bank will become the new century dinosaur". Nowadays, with the development of the Internet electronic information technology, we really felt this trend, mobile payment, electronic bank already occupies the important position in our daily life.
Due to the concept of the Internet financial almost entirely from the business practices, therefore the present study focused on the discussion. Internet financial specific mode, and the influence of traditional financial industry analysis and counter measures are lack of systemic research. Internet has always been a key battleground in risk investment, and financial industry is the thinking mode of innovative experimental various business models emerge in endlessly, so it is difficult to use a fixed set of thinking to classification and definition. The mutual penetration and integration of Internet and financial, is a reflection of technical development and market rules requirements, is an irreversible trend. The Internet bring traditional financial is not only a low cost and high efficiency, more is a kind of innovative thinking mode and unremitting pursuit of the user experience. The traditional financial industry to actively respond to. Internet financial, for such a vast blue ocean enough to change the world, it is very worthy of attention to straighten out its development, from the existing business model to its development prospects.
"Internet financial" belongs to the latest formats form, discusses the Internet financial research of literature, but the lack of systemic and more practical. So this article according to the characteristics of the Internet industry practical stronger, the several business models on the market for summary analysis, and the traditional
financial industry how to actively respond to the Internet wave of financial analysis and Suggestions are given, with strong practical significance.
2 Internet financial background
Internet financial platform based on Internet resources, on the basis of the big data and cloud computing new financial model. Internet finance with the help of the Internet technology, mobile communication technology to realize financing, payment and information intermediary business, is a traditional industry and modern information technology represented by the Internet, mobile payment, cloud computing, data mining, search engines and social networks, etc.) Produced by the combination of emerging field. Whether financial or the Internet, the Internet is just the difference on the strategic, there is no strict definition of distinction. As the financial and the mutual penetration and integration of the Internet, the Internet financial can refer all through the Internet technology to realize the financing behavior. Internet financial is the Internet and the traditional financial product of mutual infiltration and fusion, the new financial model has a profound background. The emergence of the Internet financial is a craving for cost reduction is the result of the financial subject, is also inseparable from the rapid development of modern information technology to provide technical support.
2.1 Demands factors
Traditional financial markets there are serious information asymmetry, greatly improve the transaction risk. Exhibition gradually changed people's spending habits, more and more high to the requirement of service efficiency and experience; In addition, rising operating costs, to stimulate the financial main body's thirst for financial innovation and reform; This pulled by demand factors, become the Internet financial produce powerful inner driving force.
2.2 Supply driving factor
Data mining, cloud computing and Internet search engines, such as the development of technology, financial and institutional technology platform. Innovation, enterprise profit-driven mixed management, etc., for the transformation of traditional industry and Internet companies offered financial sector penetration may,
for the birth and development of the Internet financial external technical support, become a kind of externalization of constitution. In the Internet "openness, equality, cooperation, share" platform, third-party financing and payment, online investment finance, credit evaluation model, not only makes the traditional pattern of financial markets will be great changes have taken place, and modern information technology is more easily to serve various financial entities. For the traditional financial institutions, especially in the banking, securities and insurance institutions, more opportunities than the crisis, development is better than a challenge.
3 Internet financial constitute the main body
3.1 Capital providers
Between Internet financial comprehensive, its capital providers include not only the traditional financial institutions, including penetrating into the Internet. In terms of the current market structure, the traditional financial sector mainly include commercial Banks, securities, insurance, fund and small loan companies, mainly includes the part of the Internet companies and emerging subject, such as the amazon, and some channels on Internet for the company. These companies is not only the providers of capital market, but also too many traditional so-called "low net worth clients" suppliers of funds into the market. In operation form, the former mainly through the Internet, to the traditional business externalization, the latter mainly through Internet channels to penetrate business, both externalization and penetration, both through the Internet channel to achieve the financial business innovation and reform.
3.2 Capital demanders
Internet financial mode of capital demanders although there is no breakthrough in the traditional government, enterprise and individual, but on the benefit has greatly changed. In the rise and development of the Internet financial, especially Internet companies to enter the threshold of made in the traditional financial institutions, relatively weak groups and individual demanders, have a more convenient and efficient access to capital. As a result, the Internet brought about by the universality and inclusive financial better than the previous traditional financial pattern.
3.3 Intermediaries
Internet financial rely on efficient and convenient information technology, greatly reduces the financial markets is the wrong information. Docking directly through Internet, according to both parties, transaction cost is greatly reduced, so the Internet finance main body for the dependence of the intermediary institutions decreased significantly, but does not mean that the Internet financial markets, there is no intermediary institutions. In terms of the development of the Internet financial situation at present stage, the third-party payment platform plays an intermediary role in this field, not only ACTS as a financial settlement platform, but also to the capital supply and demand of the integration of upstream and downstream link multi-faceted, in meet the funds to pay at the same time, have the effect of capital allocation. Especially in the field of electronic commerce, this function is more obvious.
3.4 Large financial data
Big financial data collection refers to the vast amounts of unstructured data, through the study of the depth of its mining and real-time analysis, grasp the customer's trading information, consumption habits and consumption information, and predict customer behavior and make the relevant financial institutions in the product design, precise marketing and greatly improve the efficiency of risk management, etc. Financial services platform based on the large data mainly refers to with vast trading data of the electronic commerce enterprise's financial services. The key to the big data from a large number of chaotic ability to rapidly gaining valuable information in the data, or from big data assets liquidation ability quickly. Big data information processing, therefore, often together with cloud computing.
4 Global economic issues
FOR much of the past year the fast-growing economies of the emerging world watched the Western financial hurricane from afar. Their own banks held few of the mortgage-based assets that undid the rich world’s financial firms. Commodity exporters were thriving, thanks to high prices for raw materials. China’s economic juggernaut powered on. And, from
互联网金融对传统金融业的影响外文文献翻译
篇四:互联网金融外文参考文献
互联网金融对传统金融业的影响外文文献翻译
(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)
译文：
互联网金融对传统金融业的影响
摘要
网络的发展，深刻地改变甚至颠覆了许多传统行业，金融业也不例外。近年来，金融业成为继商业分销、传媒之后受互联网影响最为深远的领域，许多基于互联网的金融服务模式应运而生，并对传统金融业产生了深刻的影响和巨大的冲击。“互联网金融”成为社会各界关注的焦点。
互联网金融低成本、高效率、关注用户体验，这些特点使其能够充分满足传统金融“长尾市场”的特殊需求，灵活提供更为便捷、高互联网金融外文参考文献。
效的金融服务和多样化的金融产品，大大拓展了金融服务的广度和深度，缩短了人们在时空上的距离，建立了一种全新的金融生态环境；可以有效整合、利用零散的时间、信息、资金等碎片资源，积少成多，形成规模效益，成为各类金融服务机构新的利润增长点。此外，随着互联网金融的不断渗透和融合，将给传统金融行业带来新的挑战和机遇。互联网金融可以促进传统银行业的转型，弥补传统银行在资金处理效率、信息整合等方面的不足；