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互联网金融对传统金融业的影响外文文献翻译
篇一:互联网金融的发展外文文献有哪些?
互联网金融对传统金融业的影响外文文献翻译
(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)
译文：
互联网金融对传统金融业的影响
摘要
网络的发展，深刻地改变甚至颠覆了许多传统行业，金融业也不例外。近年来，金融业成为继商业分销、传媒之后受互联网影响最为深远的领域，许多基于互联网的金融服务模式应运而生，并对传统金融业产生了深刻的影响和巨大的冲击。“互联网金融”成为社会各界关注的焦点。
互联网金融低成本、高效率、关注用户体验，这些特点使其能够充分满足传统金融“长尾市场”的特殊需求，灵活提供更为便捷、高
效的金融服务和多样化的金融产品，大大拓展了金融服务的广度和深度，缩短了人们在时空上的距离，建立了一种全新的金融生态环境；可以有效整合、利用零散的时间、信息、资金等碎片资源，积少成多，形成规模效益，成为各类金融服务机构新的利润增长点。此外，随着互联网金融的不断渗透和融合，将给传统金融行业带来新的挑战和机遇。互联网金融可以促进传统银行业的转型，弥补传统银行在资金处理效率、信息整合等方面的不足；为证券、保险、基金、理财产品的销售与推广提供新渠道。对于很多中小企业来说，互联网金融拓展了它们的融资渠道，大大降低了融资门槛，提高了资金的使用效率。但是，互联网金融的跨行业性决定了它的风险因素更为复杂、敏感、多变，因此要处理好创新发展与市场监管、行业自律的关系。
关键词：互联网金融；商业银行；影响；监管
1 引言
互联网技术的不断发展，云计算、大数据、社交网络等越来越多的互联网应用为传统行业的业务发展提供了有力支持，互联网对传统行业的渗透程度不断加深。20世纪末，微软总裁比尔盖茨就曾断言，“传统商业银行会成为新世纪的恐龙”。如今，随着互联网电子信息技术的发展，我们真切地感受到了这种趋势，移动支付、电子银行早已在我们的日常生活中占据了重要地位。
由于互联网金融的概念几乎完全来自于商业实践，因此目前的研究多集中在探讨互联网金融的具体模式上，而对传统金融行业的影响力分析和应对措施则缺乏系统性研究。互联网与金融行业一向是风险
投资的主战场，是思维模式的创新实验田，因此各种商业模式层出不穷，很难用一套固定的思维去分类、界定。互联网与金融的相互渗透与融合，是技术发展与市场规律要求的体现，是不可逆转的趋势。互联网带给传统金融的不仅仅是低成本与高效率，更在于一种创新的思维模式和对用户体验的不懈追求。而传统金融行业要去积极应对。互联网金融，对于这样一片足以改变世界的巨大蓝海，是非常值得投入精力去理顺其发展脉络，去从现有的商业模式中发现其发展前景的。
“互联网金融”属于最新的业态形式，对互联网金融进行探讨研究的文献不少，但多缺乏系统性与实践性。因此本文根据互联网行业实践性较强的特点，对市场上的几种业务模式进行概括分析，并就传统金融行业如何积极应对互联网金融浪潮给出了分析与建议，具有较强的现实意义。
2互联网金融的产生背景
互联网金融是以互联网为资源平台，以大数据和云计算为基础的新金融模式。互联网金融借助于互联网技术、移动通信技术来实现资金融通、支付和信息中介等业务，是传统金融业与以互联网为代表的现代信息科技（移动支付、云计算、数据挖掘、搜索引擎和社交网络等）相结合产生的新兴领域。不管是互联网金融还是金融互联网，只是战略上的区别，并没有严格定义区分。随着金融与互联网的相互渗透与相互融合，互联网金融可以泛指一切通过互联网技术来实现资金融通的行为。互联网金融是互联网与传统金融相互渗透和融合的产物，这种崭新的金融模式有着深刻的产生背景。互联网金融的出现既
源于金融主体对于降低成本的强烈渴求，也离不开现代信息技术迅猛发展提供的技术支撑。
2.1 需求型拉动因素
传统金融市场存在严重的信息不对称，极大的提高了交易风险；移动互联网的发展逐步改变了人们的金融消费习惯，对服务效率和体验的要求越来越高；此外，运营成本的不断上升，都刺激着金融主体对于金融创新与改革的渴求；这种由需求拉动的 因素，成为互联网金融产生的强大内在推动力。
2.2 供给型推动因素
数据挖掘、云计算以及搜索引擎等技术的发展、金融与互联网机构的技术平台的革新、企业逐利性的混业经营等，为传统金融业的转型和互联网企业向金融领域渗透提供了可能，为互联网金融的产生和发展提供了外在的技术支撑，成为一种外化的拉动力。在互联网“开放、平等、协作、分享”的平台上，第三方融资与支付、在线投资理财、信用评审等模式的不断涌现，不仅使得传统的金融市场格局发生了巨大的变化，也使现代信息科技更加便捷地服务于各金融主体。对于传统金融机构，特别是银行、证券和保险机构而言，机遇大于危机，发展胜过挑战。
3互联网金融的构成主体
3.1 资金供给者
介于互联网金融的综合性，其资金供给者不仅包括传统的金融机构，也包括渗透进入的互联网企业。就目前的市场结构而言，传统金
融机构主要有商业银行、证券、保险、基金和小额贷款公司，而新兴主体主要包括部分互联网企业，如亚马逊，还有一些以互联网为渠道的综合型公司。这些企业不仅是市场资金的供给者，更是将许多传统所谓的“低净值客户”纳入市场资金的供给方。在操作形式上，前者主要借助互联网将传统业务进行外化，后者主要通过互联网渠道将业务进行渗透，无论是外化还是渗透，二者都通过互联网渠道实现了金融业务的创新与改革。
3.2 资金需求者
互联网金融模式下的资金需求者虽然没有突破传统的政府、企业和个体的范畴，但在惠及范围上却有着很大程度的改变。互联网金融的兴起和发展，特别是互联网企业的进入使得被排挤在传统金融机构门槛之外的、相对弱势的组织和个体需求者，有了一个更加便捷和高效的资金获取渠道。因此，互联网金融所带来的普惠性和包容性更胜以往的传统金融模式。
3.3中介机构
互联网金融依靠高效、便捷的信息技术，极大降低了金融市场上存在的信息不对称，交易双方通过互联网直接对接，交易成本也大大降低，因此互联网金融主体对于中介机构的依赖性明显减弱，但并非意味着互联网金融市场就没有中介机构。就现阶段互联网金融的发展状况而言，第三方支付平台扮演了该领域中介机构的角色，不仅充当资金结算的平台，更是对资金供需的上下游环节进行多方位的整合，在满足资金支付的同时，起到资金配置的作用。尤其是在电子商务领
互联网金融外文文献翻译
篇二:互联网金融的发展外文文献有哪些?
互联网金融外文文献翻译
(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)
译文：
互联网金融对传统金融业的影响
摘要
网络的发展，深刻地改变甚至颠覆了许多传统行业，金融业也不例外。近年来，金融业成为继商业分销、传媒之后受互联网影响最为深远的领域，许多基于互联网的金融服务模式应运而生，并对传统金融业产生了深刻的影响和巨大的冲击。“互联网金融”成为社会各界关注的焦点。
互联网金融低成本、高效率、关注用户体验，这些特点使其能够充分满足传统金融“长尾市场”的特殊需求，灵活提供更为便捷、高
效的金融服务和多样化的金融产品，大大拓展了金融服务的广度和深度，缩短了人们在时空上的距离，建立了一种全新的金融生态环境；可以有效整合、利用零散的时间、信息、资金等碎片资源，积少成多，形成规模效益，成为各类金融服务机构新的利润增长点。此外，随着互联网金融的不断渗透和融合，将给传统金融行业带来新的挑战和机遇。互联网金融可以促进传统银行业的转型，弥补传统银行在资金处理效率、信息整合等方面的不足；为证券、保险、基金、理财产品的销售与推广提供新渠道。对于很多中小企业来说，互联网金融拓展了它们的融资渠道，大大降低了融资门槛，提高了资金的使用效率。但是，互联网金融的跨行业性决定了它的风险因素更为复杂、敏感、多变，因此要处理好创新发展与市场监管、行业自律的关系。
关键词：互联网金融；商业银行；影响；监管
1 引言
互联网技术的不断发展，云计算、大数据、社交网络等越来越多的互联网应用为传统行业的业务发展提供了有力支持，互联网对传统行业的渗透程度不断加深。20世纪末，微软总裁比尔盖茨就曾断言，“传统商业银行会成为新世纪的恐龙”。如今，随着互联网电子信息技术的发展，我们真切地感受到了这种趋势，移动支付、电子银行早已在我们的日常生活中占据了重要地位。
由于互联网金融的概念几乎完全来自于商业实践，因此目前的研究多集中在探讨互联网金融的具体模式上，而对传统金融行业的影响力分析和应对措施则缺乏系统性研究。互联网与金融行业一向是风险
投资的主战场，是思维模式的创新实验田，因此各种商业模式层出不穷，很难用一套固定的思维去分类、界定。互联网与金融的相互渗透与融合，是技术发展与市场规律要求的体现，是不可逆转的趋势。互联网带给传统金融的不仅仅是低成本与高效率，更在于一种创新的思维模式和对用户体验的不懈追求。而传统金融行业要去积极应对。互联网金融，对于这样一片足以改变世界的巨大蓝海，是非常值得投入精力去理顺其发展脉络，去从现有的商业模式中发现其发展前景的。
“互联网金融”属于最新的业态形式，对互联网金融进行探讨研究的文献不少，但多缺乏系统性与实践性。因此本文根据互联网行业实践性较强的特点，对市场上的几种业务模式进行概括分析，并就传统金融行业如何积极应对互联网金融浪潮给出了分析与建议，具有较强的现实意义。
2互联网金融的产生背景
互联网金融是以互联网为资源平台，以大数据和云计算为基础的新金融模式。互联网金融借助于互联网技术、移动通信技术来实现资金融通、支付和信息中介等业务，是传统金融业与以互联网为代表的现代信息科技（移动支付、云计算、数据挖掘、搜索引擎和社交网络等）相结合产生的新兴领域。不管是互联网金融还是金融互联网，只是战略上的区别，并没有严格定义区分。随着金融与互联网的相互渗透与相互融合，互联网金融可以泛指一切通过互联网技术来实现资金融通的行为。互联网金融是互联网与传统金融相互渗透和融合的产物，这种崭新的金融模式有着深刻的产生背景。互联网金融的出现既
源于金融主体对于降低成本的强烈渴求，也离不开现代信息技术迅猛发展提供的技术支撑。
2.1 需求型拉动因素
传统金融市场存在严重的信息不对称，极大的提高了交易风险；移动互联网的发展逐步改变了人们的金融消费习惯，对服务效率和体验的要求越来越高；此外，运营成本的不断上升，都刺激着金融主体对于金融创新与改革的渴求；这种由需求拉动的 因素，成为互联网金融产生的强大内在推动力。
2.2 供给型推动因素
数据挖掘、云计算以及搜索引擎等技术的发展、金融与互联网机构的技术平台的革新、企业逐利性的混业经营等，为传统金融业的转型和互联网企业向金融领域渗透提供了可能，为互联网金融的产生和发展提供了外在的技术支撑，成为一种外化的拉动力。在互联网“开放、平等、协作、分享”的平台上，第三方融资与支付、在线投资理财、信用评审等模式的不断涌现，不仅使得传统的金融市场格局发生了巨大的变化，也使现代信息科技更加便捷地服务于各金融主体。对于传统金融机构，特别是银行、证券和保险机构而言，机遇大于危机，发展胜过挑战。
3互联网金融的构成主体
3.1 资金供给者
介于互联网金融的综合性，其资金供给者不仅包括传统的金融机构，也包括渗透进入的互联网企业。就目前的市场结构而言，传统金
融机构主要有商业银行、证券、保险、基金和小额贷款公司，而新兴主体主要包括部分互联网企业，如亚马逊，还有一些以互联网为渠道的综合型公司。这些企业不仅是市场资金的供给者，更是将许多传统所谓的“低净值客户”纳入市场资金的供给方。在操作形式上，前者主要借助互联网将传统业务进行外化，后者主要通过互联网渠道将业务进行渗透，无论是外化还是渗透，二者都通过互联网渠道实现了金融业务的创新与改革。
3.2 资金需求者
互联网金融模式下的资金需求者虽然没有突破传统的政府、企业和个体的范畴，但在惠及范围上却有着很大程度的改变。互联网金融的兴起和发展，特别是互联网企业的进入使得被排挤在传统金融机构门槛之外的、相对弱势的组织和个体需求者，有了一个更加便捷和高效的资金获取渠道。因此，互联网金融所带来的普惠性和包容性更胜以往的传统金融模式。
3.3中介机构
互联网金融依靠高效、便捷的信息技术，极大降低了金融市场上存在的信息不对称，交易双方通过互联网直接对接，交易成本也大大降低，因此互联网金融主体对于中介机构的依赖性明显减弱，但并非意味着互联网金融市场就没有中介机构。就现阶段互联网金融的发展状况而言，第三方支付平台扮演了该领域中介机构的角色，不仅充当资金结算的平台，更是对资金供需的上下游环节进行多方位的整合，在满足资金支付的同时，起到资金配置的作用。尤其是在电子商务领
P2P网络借贷金融文献综述及外文文献资料
篇三:互联网金融的发展外文文献有哪些?
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献 、文献综述
一、外文文献
文献信息
标题: Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending
作者: Berger, Sven C; Gleisner, Fabian
期刊名称: Business Research；第2卷； 第1期；页码：39-65
年份: 2015.
Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P
Lending
Abstract互联网金融的发展外文文献有哪些?。
We analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these market participants act as financial intermediaries and significantly improve borrowers' credit conditions by reducing information asymmetries, predominantly for borrowers with less attractive risk characteristics. Our findings may be surprising given the replacement of a bank by an electronic marketplace.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, intermediation, social lending, electronic markets
Manuscript received July 7, 2008, accepted by Christian Schlag (Finance) March 5, 2009.
1 Introduction
The evolution of information technology in recent years has led to the development of electronic marketplaces where traditional intermediaries may be less important or even redundant for the economic interaction of market participants (Benjamin and
Wigand 1995, Evans and Wurster 1997, Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Within the financial services industry, the debate about disintermediation and the future relevance of financial intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 2001, Nellis, McCaffery, and Hutchinson 2000, Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell 1999) is fueled by the increasing role of electronic lending markets (P2P Lending or Social Lending) where an electronic marketplace replaces a bank as the traditional intermediary and enables the brokerage of consumer loans directly between borrowers and lenders (Hulme and Wright 2006, Meyer 2007). A recent study predicts that within the next few years such social banking platforms may have a market share of ten percent of the worldwide market for retail lending and financial planning (Gartner Inc. 2008). For the US, the P2P lending market is estimated to grow to a volume of up to ten billion USD within the next 10 years (Bruene 2007). We examine more than 14,000 credit transactions on the American electronic P2P lending platform Prosper.com, covering all transactions that took place in the market between 2005-11 and 2007-09. Our analysis of the P2P credit market starts with the observation that, despite the direct mediation of loans in the marketplace, new types of intermediaries emerge as market participants provide paid intermediary services. In the paper we then focus on the following questions: (1) From a theoretical point of view, how can these intermediaries create value in the interaction between borrowers and lenders? (2) Should all borrowers make use of an intermediary, and can it make sense to pay for intermediary services? (3) From the borrowers' perspective, what is the economic impact of intermediation in the electronic lending marketplace? Our empirical analysis is confirmatory in nature. It is based on the literature on financial intermediation (e. g., Diamond 1984, Leland and Pyle 1976) from which we derive hypotheses on the role of intermediaries in electronic marketplaces.
The electronic lending platform Prosper provides an excellent laboratory for studying intermediaries in electronic marketplaces. Prosper is the largest provider with nearly 90 million USD in loans originated in the examination period from 2005-11 to 2007-09, as market participants were permitted to act as paid intermediaries in this period. As of 2008-09-30, Prosper dominated the US market for P2P lending with a
total of 176 million USD in issued loans, followed by its competitor Lending Club with 19 million USD.1 At that time, the market share of P2P consumer loans represented a fraction of the around 490 billion USD of non-revolving consumer credit outstanding at commercial banks (Federal Reserve 2008). All loans on Prosper have an identical maturity of 36 months. Our data sample includes detailed information on 14,321 financial transactions as well as the market participants that chose to participate in the market and covers transactions with and without the use of an intermediary. This allows us to test for aspects of the financial transaction and individual factors that might influence the usage of intermediary services. In line with traditional intermediation theory, we find that financial intermediaries on electronic P2P lending platforms have significant impact on borrowers' credit conditions, suggesting that intermediation helps to reduce the prevalent information asymmetries. The intermediary primarily contributes by screening potential borrowers. A mandatory screening process by means of the intermediary's commitment to screen every borrower within the group significantly improves borrowers' access to credit. Following diligent screening, the intermediary's recommendation of a borrower signals better information about creditworthiness and thus leads to better credit conditions. Moreover, bidding on the screened borrower's credit listing has an even stronger impact on the resulting interest rate.
Our results indicate that borrowers should consider the reputation of an intermediary as it serves as a good proxy for the future diligent assessment of borrowers. Intermediation costs can be compensated by lower interest margins for borrowers. These results are robust to self-selection regarding the choice of an intermediary and characteristics of the financial transaction. All in all, our results suggest that financial intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces may create substantial value for borrowers. Our findings are consistent with a stream of literature suggesting that electronic markets create business opportunities for new intermediaries (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Methlie and Pedersen 2002, Bakos 1991, Bakos 1998, Sen and King 2003). Despite the electronic credit marketplace enables the direct mediation of loans, new financial intermediaries emerge between borrowers and lenders. There are
several reasons why our results are of particular interest also for banks and other financial service providers that face the strategic decision of an active involvement in electronic lending markets. One option could be to participate in these marketplaces and offer financial advisory. Another interesting possibility could be to enter the P2P lending market and to establish a new marketplace to support the existing retail operations and enable cross-selling. Eventually, lending marketplaces are potential customers for banks' transaction services.
Our approach to examining the role of financial intermediaries on electronic lending platforms makes three important contributions to the literature: First, this is one of the first studies analyzing an electronic lending marketplace, and the first study to empirically examine intermediation on an electronic P2P lending platform. We explain how electronic credit markets work, and provide insights into the role of intermediaries in the marketplace. Second, we test theoretical predictions from the literature on financial intermediation with new data. Our sample of more than 14,000 transactions on a P2P lending marketplace includes detailed information on the involved market participants and the loan characteristics. The dataset covers the complete transaction history of the credit marketplace for a time period of almost two years. Third, we quantify the economic impact of intermediation and other transaction characteristics on borrowers' loan spread and show that the usage of financial intermediaries which are neither professional nor institutional but members of the network may significantly improve the terms of trade for the borrowers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section gives an overview of electronic P2P lending platforms and explains the functioning of these marketplaces. Section 3 summarizes the relevant previous literature on financial intermediation and derives hypotheses about the role of intermediaries on electronic lending platforms. Section 4 overviews the methodology employed, describes the data, and presents the empirical results of our analyses as well as robustness tests. In section 5 we conclude with a summary and the limitations of our study.
2 Intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces
2.1 Electronic marketplaces and disintermediation
Markets are essential for economic activity in mediating the demand for and supply of goods and services. Intermediaries help to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers by (1) providing transaction processing capabilities, (2) bringing enhanced levels of knowledge and expertise, and (3) adding to the transactability of a given good or service (Chircu and Kauffman 2000).
The internet has made e-commerce possible where electronic markets are becoming more important in coordinating supply and demand (Grieger 2003, Segev, Gebauer, and Farber 1999). Electronic markets can facilitate economic activity even under complex and insecure conditions (Cordella 2006), significantly reduce information and transaction costs, and may in this way displace traditional intermediaries (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Many authors argue that once electronic markets emerge, traditional intermediaries may be threatened by an electronic brokerage effect also called disintermediation (for a literature overview see Chircu and Kauffman 2000). In sharp contrast to that, the theoretical contributions on electronic markets and disintermediation have not yet been supported by convincing empirical evidence (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Sen and King 2003). Moreover, the displacement of traditional intermediaries may never occur. Authors like Sarkar, Butler, and Steinfield (1998) or Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that electronic markets may lead to new forms of intermediation.
2.2 Electronic lending platforms
Electronic lending platforms are electronic markets that mediate between borrowers and lenders of loans.Wefocus here on consumer loans between individual borrowers and lenders and exclude platforms for bonds or syndicated loans (Steelmann 2006). The electronic credit marketplace as a website in the World Wide Web constitutes the general conditions for peer-to-peer lending and provides the administration of current loans. Electronic lending platforms differ in the way loans are originated: Some providers mediate between borrowers and lenders themselves, whereas other providers match borrowers' credit listings and lenders' bids with an auction mechanism (Meyer 2007).
The lion share of participants in the marketplace are private individuals, although
P2P 网络借贷文献综述及外文文献互联网金融
篇四:互联网金融的发展外文文献有哪些?
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献 、文献综述
一、外文文献
标题: Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending
作者: Berger, Sven C; Gleisner, Fabian
期刊: Business Research；卷: 2；期: 1；页: 39-65；出版年份: 2009
Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P
Lending
Abstract
We analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these market participants act as financial intermediaries and significantly improve borrowers' credit conditions by reducing information asymmetries, predominantly for borrowers with less attractive risk characteristics. Our findings may be surprising given the replacement of a bank by an electronic marketplace.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, intermediation, social lending, electronic markets
1 Introduction
The evolution of information technology in recent years has led to the development of electronic marketplaces where traditional intermediaries may be less important or even redundant for the economic interaction of market participants (Benjamin and Wigand 1995, Evans and Wurster 1997, Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Within the financial services industry, the debate about disintermediation and the future relevance of financial intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 2001, Nellis, McCaffery, and Hutchinson 2000, Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell 1999) is fueled by the increasing role of electronic lending markets (P2P Lending or Social Lending) where an electronic marketplace replaces a bank as the traditional intermediary and enables the brokerage of consumer loans directly between borrowers and lenders (Hulme and Wright 2006, Meyer 2007). A recent study predicts that within the next few years such social banking platforms may have a market share of ten percent of the worldwide market for retail lending and financial planning (Gartner Inc. 2008). For the US, the P2P lending market is estimated to grow to a volume of up to ten billion USD within the next 10 years (Bruene 2007). We examine more than 14,000 credit transactions on the American electronic P2P lending platform Prosper.com, covering all transactions that took place in the market between 2005-11 and 2007-09. Our analysis of the P2P credit market starts with the observation that, despite the direct mediation of loans in the marketplace, new types of intermediaries emerge as market participants provide
paid intermediary services. In the paper we then focus on the following questions: (1) From a theoretical point of view, how can these intermediaries create value in the interaction between borrowers and lenders? (2) Should all borrowers make use of an intermediary, and can it make sense to pay for intermediary services? (3) From the borrowers' perspective, what is the economic impact of intermediation in the electronic lending marketplace? Our empirical analysis is confirmatory in nature. It is based on the literature on financial intermediation (e. g., Diamond 1984, Leland and Pyle 1976) from which we derive hypotheses on the role of intermediaries in electronic marketplaces.
2 Intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces互联网金融的发展外文文献有哪些?。
2.1 Electronic marketplaces and disintermediation
Markets are essential for economic activity in mediating the demand for and supply of goods and services. Intermediaries help to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers by (1) providing transaction processing capabilities, (2) bringing enhanced levels of knowledge and expertise, and (3) adding to the transactability of a given good or service (Chircu and Kauffman 2000).
The internet has made e-commerce possible where electronic markets are becoming more important in coordinating supply and demand (Grieger 2003, Segev, Gebauer, and Farber 1999). Electronic markets can facilitate economic activity even under complex and insecure conditions (Cordella 2006), significantly reduce information and transaction costs, and may in this way displace traditional intermediaries (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Many authors argue that once electronic markets emerge, traditional intermediaries may be threatened by an electronic brokerage effect also called disintermediation (for a literature overview see Chircu and Kauffman 2000). In sharp contrast to that, the theoretical contributions on electronic markets and disintermediation have not yet been supported by convincing empirical evidence (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Sen and King 2003). Moreover, the displacement of traditional intermediaries may never occur. Authors like Sarkar, Butler, and Steinfield (1998) or Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that electronic markets may lead to new forms of intermediation.
2.2 Electronic lending platforms
Electronic lending platforms are electronic markets that mediate between borrowers and lenders of loans.Wefocus here on consumer loans between individual borrowers and lenders and exclude platforms for bonds or syndicated loans (Steelmann 2006). The electronic credit marketplace as a website in the World Wide Web constitutes the general conditions for peer-to-peer lending and provides the administration of current loans. Electronic lending platforms differ in the way loans are originated: Some providers mediate between borrowers and lenders themselves, whereas other providers match borrowers' credit listings and lenders' bids with an auction mechanism (Meyer 2007).互联网金融的发展外文文献有哪些?。
The lion share of participants in the marketplace are private individuals, although there are institutional lenders investing in some, too. There are numerous providers that operate nationally due to differing regulatory frameworks. Table 1 provides an overview of the three major Anglo-American and German providers and their
business models. A recent development of the business model of P2P lending marketplaces is that lenders may trade loans prior to maturity, increasing the liquidity of P2P loans. As of February 2009, Prosper is still in the process, whereas Lending Club has already successfully registered with the SEC to create a secondary loan market. Despite differing business models, there is one distinctive feature that these marketplaces have in common: Transactions in electronic credit marketplaces occur anonymously between fictitious "screen names". Therefore, information is asymmetrically distributed between borrowers and lenders. Loans are not collateralized and lenders face the inherent risk of default (Steelmann 2006).
Despite anonymous interactions, loan listings contain additional information on potential borrowers. Lenders can evaluate individual creditworthiness through quantitative as well as qualitative figures. Prosper.com, America's largest peer-topeer lending marketplace, provides an individual rating and an indicator of indebtedness in cooperation with the credit reporting agency Experian as the two main quantitative figures. The informational value of these figures should be considered high, although the degree to which consumer credit reports are accurate, complete or consistent is in dispute (Avery, Calem, Canner, and Bostic 2003). Most platforms give market participants the opportunity to provide additional personal information about their background, their financial standing and the purpose of the loan. This qualitative, "soft" information is mandatory and its validity is a priori not controlled. Borrowers thereby might have an incentive to overemphasize their "quality" (the present value of the prospective projects, their financial standing or payment behavior) in their personal descriptions (moral hazard).
2.3 Groups on Prosper.com
In addition to personal profiles, borrowers and lenders can form groups. These smaller communities within the marketplace review and assess the creditworthiness of individual members. Groups are potentially beneficial for market participants by providing and verifying information or obtaining additional information about borrowers that is not publicly available. Groups lack distinct ownership and governance features as they typically exist in credit cooperatives (Davis 2001, Taylor 1971). There is no ownership of the groups, and there is no collective decision mechanism on accepting group members or granting loans. Furthermore, groups do not exclusively deal with their members. At any time, lenders from outside the group may invest in a group member's loan listing. This implies that there is no rotation of money within the group, and no specific allocation process. There are two papers that specifically examine the role of groups on the P2P lending website Prosper.com: Freedman and Jin (2008) use transaction data from 200601-06 until 2008-07-31 covering around 290,000 loan listings and 25,000 funded loans. They find evidence for the idea that the monitoring within social networks provides a stronger incentive to pay off loans ex-post: Loans with friend endorsements and friend bids have fewer missed payments and yield significantly higher rates of return than other loans. Everett (2008) looks at the influence of group membership on loan default within 13,486 Prosper loans. The dataset covers funded loans from 2006-05-31 until 2007-11-06 and incorporates ex post loan performance information until 2008-05-07.
He finds that membership in a group significantly decreases loan default risk if the group enforces real-life personal connections like, e.g., employees of the same company or alumni of a certain university. Both studies presented above look at social networks in the credit market but do not specifically take the group leader into account. It is, however, not the group as an institution per se, but the group leader who decides about membership and plays a substantial role in the lending process.
2.4 Group leaders as financial intermediaries
In order to reduce information asymmetries, lenders must screen potential borrowers. Given the large number of available credit listings, it can be costly or impossible to process the information available about potential borrowers. Therefore, intermediaries emerge in the electronic marketplace offering intermediary services in order to assess and limit credit risk. Every participant in the online lending platform can found a group and become a group leader. Group leaders set membership criteria and administer the group. Groups are smaller communities within the marketplace where group members may share a bond based on employment, geography, education, common leisure activities, or other factors. The principle that people from close communities act more responsibly towards each other aims to lower the risk of defaults and therefore enables lending at better rates. Among the most important tasks of the group leader is the screening of borrowers within the group (a voluntary due diligence known as "vetting"). Within groups, it is common that borrowers send personal documents regarding their identity, income, and other pertinent information to the group leader. The group leader may also establish personal contact with the borrowers' employer to verify the personal income in order to recommend a borrower's credit listing.
All in all, the intermediary reduces uncertainty for lenders, which should be reflected in lower required risk premiums. The arguments provided above lead us to the first fundamental hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1: Borrowers within groups are able to borrow at lower credit spreads. Next, we formulate three hypotheses that enable us to decompose the role of the group leader in the lending marketplace. With imperfect information about borrowers' credit quality, lenders can use publicly observable signals to assess credit risk (Riley 1975, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Spence 1973). Observable characteristics or actions can serve as signals. On the electronic lending platform Prosper, the recommendation of a credit listing by a group leader is a strong observable signal of credit quality. Borrowers can voluntarily provide additional private information regarding their financial standing to their group leader. Group leaders can then recommend credit listings within their groups. This observable recommendation serves as a signal of good credit quality for the marketplace.This leads to:
Hypothesis H2: The recommendation of a credit listing by the group leader leads to lower credit spreads.